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ABSTRACT 
The baraza project, initiated in 2009, is a government-led initiative in Uganda that aims to increase the 
quality of public service delivery through the provision of information and the involvement of 
beneficiaries in project monitoring by means of providing citizens with an advocacy forum. This study 
provides a qualitative assessment of the self-identified pathways through which barazas are expected to 
influence public service delivery, as expressed by participant stakeholders; and the motivating factors 
behind behavioral changes surrounding the baraza implementation, hindrances to achieving positive 
outcomes, and opportunities in the implementation of barazas in the future. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Uganda’s economic liberalization efforts in the mid-1980s and the decentralization drive in the early 
1990s profoundly altered the functioning of the government in public service provision. However, public 
service delivery has continued to suffer from ineffective monitoring and weak accountability 
mechanisms, especially with respect to beneficiaries holding the service providers accountable (Bjorkman 
and Svensson 2009, Steiner 2007, Francis and James 2003, Muriisa 2008). Reinikka and Svenssons 
(2004) document massive elite capture of funds in the education sector as an example.  Follow-up studies 
showed that the provision of information and the involvement of beneficiaries through village meetings 
can improve both quantity and quality of public service delivery (Reinikka and Svensson 2011, Bjorkman 
and Svensson 2009). 
In response to the lack of monitoring and poor accountability processes, the government of 
Uganda initiated the baraza project in 2009.1 Barazas are citizen advocacy forums, the stated aim of 
which is to “enhance public involvement in holding the government accountable for service delivery in 
relation to the resources spent” (OPM 2013). In practice, barazas are initiated by the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM) and organized at the sub-county or district level. Barazas bring together government 
officials, policy makers and public service providers (civil servants) on the policy implementation side, 
together with the users of public services (citizens) on the other side. Key sectors for discourse include 
agriculture, education, water and sanitation, health, and infrastructure. 
Currently, a large-scale impact evaluation of the baraza initiative, funded by the International 
Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) and implemented by a team of researchers from the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), is ongoing.2 Through a cluster randomized control trial, it will be 
possible to quantify the impacts of the baraza initiative on the quantity and quality of public service 
1 Baraza is a generic term for meetings in Uganda. Barazas are organized by different actors in Uganda, especially 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). The barazas we are studying here are the 
“official” ones that are initiated by the office of the prime minister. While official barazas may be (and in the past have been) 
abused by politicians to get a forum, they may also be more effective in encouraging officials to show up. 
2 See http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/evidence/impact-evaluations/details/2905/ for more information. 
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delivery in each of the sectors mentioned above. The quantitative research design will also allow the 
comparison of the relative effectiveness of the two main components of a baraza: (1) information 
provision, whereby officials report on planned activities and achievements and (2) deliberation, whereby 
citizens are encouraged to engage with and challenge civil servants. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis 
will allow comparison of district level barazas to barazas that are held at the lower sub-county level. 
While experimental approaches are considered the best way to empirically establish causal 
claims, an important criticism is that these methods merely provide a black box view of causality and 
often fail to identify the mechanisms that link the intervention to the outcome. However, especially in the 
context of economic development, one does not only want to know if something works or does not work, 
but also why (Deaton 2009). While there exist formal ways to look at causal pathways such as mediation 
analysis, adapted research designs may be warranted (Kusoke et al 2013). Quantitative impact evaluations 
also sometimes attempt to open the black box by looking at intermediate outcomes: the baraza 
quantitative impact evaluation will also investigate changes in accountability and citizen empowerment. 
Often, however, intermediate outcomes and mediators are poorly defined or hard to measure.  
In this paper, we take a qualitative research approach to explore the potential causal pathways that 
underlie outcomes that may emanate from baraza interventions and the behavioral change of actors, as 
well as examining hindrances to achieving positive outcomes and opportunities for the implementation of 
future barazas. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with (a) politicians as the principals 
initiating and monitoring the services; (b) civil servants as the agents delivering the services; and (c) 
citizens as the clients consuming the services, we attempt to attribute potential impacts to the baraza 
interventions.  In doing so, we engage these stakeholders to articulate their preconceptions of how the 
baraza will or will not achieve impact, also known as the “theory of change”.  
This qualitative assessment has three key purposes: First, as the initial exploratory assessment, 
the study sheds light on what influences the already-conducted barazas may have had. One benefit of such 
an initial investigation is that it gives the OPM, the implementing government partner, something to have 
in their hands while waiting on the quantitative analysis that is still underway. Insights from such a study 
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provide a first take on how the barazas may be affecting the amount and quality of public services 
provided – or if they are not. Second, this qualitative analysis can help to identify potential impact 
pathways of the barazas through the exploratory approach described above, providing essential feedback 
as the basis for empirical cross-validation and potential revision of the theory of change underpinning the 
study. Third, the in-depth interviews provide the benefit of informing the design of the complementary 
quantitative surveys conducted as part of the larger impact evaluation and guide the interpretation of the 
analytical results by pointing to previously unexpected outcomes and issues and by suggesting hypotheses 
about key relationships and indicators tested in the quantitative analysis (Kabunga et al. 2014). 
We find that stakeholders think barazas are useful at improving public service delivery across all 
sectors, especially in Bagezza where the barazas took place at the sub-county level. Stakeholders had no 
difficulty providing examples of changes they felt were the direct result of the baraza being held: projects 
that were previously dragging were finished or taken up afresh; sub-standard work was redone; and in 
some instances, priorities were changed to better align with citizens’ needs. A substantial part of these 
outcomes seemed to derive from the baraza’s potential to simply fix information asymmetries. The focus 
group discussion suggests civil servants responded to the consequences of the increased likelihood of sub-
standard work being exposed, and politicians responded to electoral considerations. There are also 
indications that barazas increased community involvement, as well as top-down monitoring. 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Sections two and three offer a summary 
of the primary stakeholders involved in the barazas, and the methodology used to interview them, 
respectively. Section four describes the study areas for this qualitative analysis. Section five enumerates 
the perceived influence of the baraza intervention by the interviewed project participants organized by 
sector theme. Section six outlines the potential pathways to which respondents attributed the changes that 
they feel they have observed, while section seven recounts respondents’ understandings of the underlying 
motivating factors evidenced by the changed behaviors or norms other participant groups displayed. In 
section eight, we report the given factors that reduced the desired effectiveness of the barazas. We 
conclude with the recommendations offered by the interviewees for future barazas in section nine. 
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2. KEY PLAYERS IN THE BARAZA 
A baraza aims to provide a platform where three types of stakeholders interact: politicians, civil servants 
and citizens. Elected politicians initiate and formulate development plans and oversee and monitor the 
implementation of policies and programs. They are mandated by the citizens, and as such are supposed to 
be sensitive to their priorities and uphold their interests. Second, citizens are the main beneficiaries of the 
public services. They contribute through taxes (or in some cases, directly through labor) and are required 
to utilize the services according to regulations and safeguard public infrastructure. Third, there is the 
technical staff, who are contracted by government and are responsible for service provision and 
implementation of government programs and projects.  
Under the local government system, there are five administrative levels, organized as local 
councils (LCs), within the districts of Uganda.  The lowest administrative level is the LC I, responsible 
for an individual neighborhood or small village. LC II through LC IV cover a range of sub-district local 
government while the LC V has responsibility over the district. A council is the highest political authority 
within the area of jurisdiction of local government and has the legislative and executive powers which are 
exercised in accordance with Uganda’s constitution. In regard to public service delivery in rural Uganda, 
LC III and LC V at the sub-county and district level, respectively, are the most important political and 
administrative units. 
In contrast to the former centralized government structure, where public service officials at the 
LC III level would implement the development plans formulated by the central government at the LC V 
level, then report back to the LC V central government again, the decentralization of the government led 
to the design by which LC III technical staff became responsible to report to LC II or LC I officials, who 
are directly accountable to the citizens within their purview. In a similar manner, the structure by which a 
problem or issue identified at the local level is to be handled is first to bring it before the local LC I, after 
which it is passed up to subsequent LC levels as required until it reaches the administrative level in which 
there is sufficient authority over the issue to resolve it (Murissa 2008). 
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On a given baraza event, the three stakeholders are each represented by both district level and 
sub-county level equivalents. The political wing government officials are represented by the District LC 
V chairperson and the Sub-county LC III chairperson.3 As mentioned earlier, these are political heads that 
constitute committees that initiate projects, approve budgets, and monitor government programs and 
service delivery. The technical wing is also assumed to be represented at both LC III and LC V levels: the 
head of civil service at the district level, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who oversees the 
various sectors and each of the sector heads (e.g. agriculture, education, health, and roads), is expected to 
attend the baraza event. The sub-county equivalent of the CAO is the sub-county chief. There may also be 
civil servants that are responsible for different sectors at the sub-county level. While most of the 
information will be provided by the district-level politicians and civil servants, the district-level officials 
may provide clarification if needed.  
Until the onset of this research, each baraza in Uganda was initiated, coordinated, and logistically 
supported by the OPM. However, today, barazas are still logistically supported by the OPM but 
implementation has been decentralized. While the selection of baraza intervention sites is dictated by 
independent random assignment as stipulated in the study design (Kabunga et al. 2014), local 
coordination and mobilization is led by the office of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) in each 
respective district. Moreover, RDCs and carefully selected baraza moderators have now been equipped 
with additional skills on how to facilitate barazas and report in a timely way to relevant authorities, 
especially the OPM. Additionally, barazas are now preceded with posters relaying information about 
service delivery in strategic locations across the sub-county where barazas will take place.  
To date, a smaller proportion of barazas have been held at the district level while the majority 
were organized at lower local governments specifically at the sub-counties. One of the major empirical 
questions in the impact evaluation is to assess whether district barazas, while cheaper to implement, are as 
                                                     
3  Note that the positions of chairperson and vice-chairperson, among others, are identical within each LC level, and 
these are all elected positions.  There is also a special government official that plays an important role in Uganda: The Resident 
District Commissioner (RDC). RDCs are government-appointed positions at the district level, who are assigned the purpose of 
representing the national government’s interests. 
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effective as sub-county barazas. It is important to note that even when the baraza is organized at the sub-
county level, the main representatives for the government that are invited to the baraza are from the 
district level. The CAO and each sector head present plans and accomplishments for the sub-county. 
  7 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We use semi-structured interviews with focus groups consisting of different stakeholders, at both the 
district and sub-county level, to elicit key political and socioeconomic differences that can be implicitly 
linked to the baraza intervention. We interviewed (1) the political leaders in selected districts and sub-
counties responsible for planning, approval, and monitoring of the various government programs and 
projects; (2) the technical staff responsible for service provision; (3) residents/citizens, as the main 
beneficiaries of public services; (4) community baraza facilitators; and (5) other key informants 
knowledgeable about the baraza and public service provision.  
Politicians such as the RDC and the LC chairs were interviewed in one-on-one interviews, to 
enable them to speak more freely. CAO were also interviewed individually. Sector heads were 
interviewed in small groups of 2 or 3 people. Citizens were interviewed in groups of between 5 and 10 
people. For citizens, we made sure to have a representative group of society, making sure to include 
youth, women, farmers, businessmen, CSO members, etc. We conducted interviews at both the district 
level for the district-level baraza we study and at both the district and sub-county level for the sub-county 
level baraza (see study area below). In total we conducted about 20 interviews, of which 2 were focus 
groups with citizens,3 were semi-structured interviews with small groups of service providers, and the 
rest were semi-structured interviews with politicians, higher level civil servants and experts. 
Both semi-structured interviews and focus groups discussions were structured around the same 
three questions. The interviews began first with a general question, asking if a particular stakeholder 
thought public service delivery in any sector had changed after the baraza. We then often probed if 
information about this aspect of public service delivery was given or if the topic was discussed during the 
baraza. 
Second, we asked each of the three main actors (politicians, civil servants and citizens) if the 
performance, behavior, or perceptions of the other stakeholders had changed after the baraza. For 
instance, we asked citizens if they felt civil servants such as doctors and nurses addressed concerns that 
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were brought up during the baraza. We asked if the citizens thought politicians altered the way they do 
business. We also asked politicians if civil servants changed their behavior after a baraza. The same 
politicians were also asked if citizens have changed their behavior or expectations as a result of the 
baraza. Finally, civil servants were asked if politicians now act differently from how they acted before the 
baraza, and if citizens changed their behavior following the event. 
Finally, we inquired about likely motivations behind any of the observed changes in the 
performance, behavior, or perceptions of stakeholders. For instance, we asked citizens what they thought 
led civil servants to change behavior or about the likely consequences if they had not altered their 
behavior. Again, these kinds of questions were asked of each stakeholder group, concerning their 
impressions of the others.  
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4. STUDY AREA 
Interviews were conducted in Bagezza Sub-county of Mubende District where a sub-county baraza was 
held on September 16, 2016.4 About 210 people attended the baraza in Bagezza Sub-county. Bagezza 
consists of 8 parishes, and posters were put up in each parish. The five sectors of agricultural production, 
education, health, water and sanitation as well as rural road infrastructure were discussed and issues and 
concerns raised. The event was coordinated and attended by the RDC. The baraza was also attended by 
the Minister of General Duties in the OPM, the LC V, the CAO, and sector heads of the following areas: 
education, health, road works, agriculture, water, and sanitation, among others. Participants were 
reportedly very assertive, many pointing out empty promises made by the government. 
We can use the baseline data that was collected as part of the quantitative impact assessment to 
get an idea of how the sub-county is doing compared to the overall average. For instance, with respect to 
public service delivery in the agricultural sector, we find that about 11 percent of households received a 
home visit  from an extension officer in the previous year. In Bagezza Sub-county, this proportion is 
slightly higher. Only about 12 percent of households report that they received a visit by a member of the 
Village Health Team, suggesting the poor performance of the public health system within the sub-county. 
For the country as a whole, more than half of the households report they have received a visit in the last 
year. Looking at the main source of water, we find a very high reliance on rainwater in Baggeza. While 
on average about 22 percent of households depend on rain as their main supply of water, this percentage 
is as high as 70 in the sub-county. When we asked villagers to rank sectors, we find that water is the main 
problem within the district, with 43 percent of households mentioning that this is the most important 
sector that needs improvements. This share is 30 percent for Uganda as a whole.  
The second location of interviews was in Masindi, where a district-level baraza was held on  
October 14, 2016.5 In keeping with the quantitative research design, the district-level baraza involved an 
                                                     
4 Interviews were conducted in July 2017. As such, about 10 months have passed since the sub-county baraza was held. 
5 Interviews were conducted in July 2017. As such, about 9 months have passed since the district baraza was held. 
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information and dissemination component, as did all the other district barazas. This baraza was also fairly 
attended with representatives from the OPM, with the district political and technical teams making 
presentations and receiving feedback from the citizens as appropriate. Discussions quickly revealed 
challenges in the district due to poor working relationship between the political (LC V) and technical 
(CAO) leaders of the district. 
We can again use data from the baseline to get a sense of the relative state of public service 
delivery within the district. For agriculture, only about 4.8 percent of households were visited by an 
extension worker in the last year, while this was 11 percent nationwide. For the health sector, we find that 
almost 30 percent of households within the district were visited by someone from the Village Health 
Team in the past 12 months. While this is higher than the proportion reported in Bagezza Sub-county, this 
is still substantially below the national average. In Masindi, most households seem to obtain water from a 
protected source (53 percent, while the national average is 46 percent). In the district, 31 percent of 
households mentioned that health is the most important sector, closely followed by water. However, the 
proportions are in line with the national averages. 
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5. PERCEIVED PATHWAYS OF INFLUENCE 
According to the respondents in this study, the barazas were generally useful at improving public service 
delivery across all sectors, especially in Bagezza where the barazas took place at the sub-county level. 
Stakeholders had no difficulty providing examples of changes they felt were the direct result of the baraza 
being held: projects that were previously dragging were finished or taken up afresh; sub-standard work 
was redone; and in some instances, priorities were changed to better align with citizens’ needs. A 
substantial part of these outcomes seemed to derive from the baraza’s potential to simply fix information 
asymmetries. As expected, civil servants responded to the consequences of the increased likelihood of 
sub-standard work being exposed, and politicians responded to electoral considerations. Overall, barazas, 
as intended, increased community involvement but also top-down monitoring. 
The following subsections outline specific examples given by the respondents in this study 
concerning the effects of the barazas held, organized by the following sectors: roads, water, education, 
health, agriculture and others. 
Roads 
• Citizens that attended the Baggeza Sub-county baraza reported that the construction of a six-
kilometer-long road, stretching from Majani Chai (a tea plantation) to Nabikakala Parish, 
took place as a direct result of the baraza. Citizens feel the baraza significantly accelerated 
the work. 
• The Masindi District baraza was said to have affected planning with respect to road 
infrastructural works. Financial resources had been allocated to widen a particular stretch of 
road where a few serious accidents had taken place in the recent past. However, during the 
baraza, the situation in Kiizi swamp was highlighted. A bridge had been washed away there, 
and children on one end of the bridge could no longer cross to get to the school on the other 
end. After the baraza, priorities were changed and Kiizi swamp was considered an 
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emergency. Since the baraza, the bridge has been repaired and even some additional work on 
the road has been completed. It was felt that the baraza was instrumental in aligning 
government priorities with community interests. 
Water 
• There were many complaints about access to safe and clean water in Bagezza Sub-county that 
were raised at the baraza. Water scarcity was mentioned as a major problem. Following the 
baraza, water pipes were brought on site and trenches were dug, beginning from the tea 
plantation up to Mugungulu Parish. While the digging was still ongoing at the time of the 
interviews, villagers expressed hope that the residents of this area would soon have piped 
water access. 
• At the Masindi District baraza, complaints concerning stolen water meters, overbilling, and 
general poor attendance to water-related problems were voiced. In one sub-county of 
Masindi, water had been tapped and transported to another sub-county, with no benefit 
accruing to the residents of the originating sub-county. After the baraza, some improvements 
were cited, such as chlorine dispensers being fixed and stolen meters replaced. 
Education 
• During the Bagezza Sub-county baraza, residents complained that the government promised a 
“seed” secondary school in Mugungulu Parish, but that no follow-up action had ensued.6 
During the baraza, officials from the education department explained that the district accounts 
had recently received substantial funds from the central government for the construction of 
this school. After the baraza, land surveying took place and it was reported that the 
government had hired 21 new teachers in January 2017, giving the impression that plans for 
                                                     
6  Seed schools were established by the Government in sub-counties for the implementation of the Universal Secondary 
Education program.  
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the school’s construction and operationalization were becoming more concrete. According to 
stakeholders interviewed, the barazas were important in making this information available to 
all parties involved. 
• During the Masindi District baraza, the community raised concerns regarding the 
mushrooming of several private but poorly performing schools in the area. In many of these 
schools, local elites have invested heavily, making the matter somewhat sensitive. As a result 
of the baraza, respondents reported that there are now more intensified inspections in these 
schools. The Masindi District CAO also confirmed that the school inspection system was 
strengthened following complaints about the quality of schooling, especially in private 
schools.  
Health 
• Citizens that attended the Baggeza Sub-county baraza raised complaints of medical staff 
absenteeism in health centers and poor conduct by health workers. In response, the health-
sector head explained that many of the medical staff were on study leave. This information 
prompted the RDC to request that the CAO should compile a list of medical staff with 
detailed information about the study leave and put in place disciplinary measures to reduce 
absenteeism that is not related to study leave. After the discussion at the baraza, respondents 
reported that health staff started reporting at 8 am, when formerly they came in at 11 am or 
noon. In addition, health workers who used to be very rude to patients have changed their 
behavior and respondents attributed the changes to the baraza.  
• At Baggeza Sub-county baraza, it was mentioned that a water tank was needed at one of the 
health centers. After the baraza, a tank was constructed at the respective health center. 
• Insufficient provision of medical supplies such as essential drugs, necessary equipment and 
accessories such as gloves, were brought up at the baraza meeting at Baggeza Sub-county 
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baraza. Unfortunately, the problem of insufficient medical supplies had not been addressed 
by the time of our interviews. However, the Mubende District CAO reported that, in response 
to the report of missing medicines in the health centers, an investigation was instituted after 
the baraza and several individuals had been arrested for drug theft. In addition, a full-time 
guard was hired for increased monitoring of the premises, and some deliberate staff changes 
were also executed in relation to the events that took place. 
• At the Masindi District baraza, it was realized that there was a mismatch in the report 
presented by the District Health Officer (from Masindi Main Hospital) between the number 
of motorcycles destined for distribution to rural health centers (HC IIs) and the actual number 
of the motorcycles distributed. After this was raised at the baraza, all the motorcycles were 
recovered and distributed to the intended recipients (HC IIs).  
• At the Masindi District baraza, it was reported that work on the construction of a soak pit was 
not complete, even though a proof of completion had been issued by the contractor. As a 
result of the baraza, the concern was followed up and the contractor was forced to finish the 
job.  
• At the Masindi District baraza, there were also complaints about blood shortages in the 
hospital. After the baraza, Masindi Hospital teamed up with Hoima Referral Hospital to 
ensure a better supply. Blood donation campaigns were also organized.  
• It was further reported at the Masindi District baraza that there was no proper waiting room at 
Masindi District Hospital. After the baraza, a small makeshift structure was set up for patients 
as they wait for additional funding from the center to construct a proper waiting area.  
• It was learned during the Masindi District baraza that the access road to Masindi Hospital was 
in very bad shape. Stakeholders reported that there was progress in the repairing of this 
  15 
access road. The engineer is now awaiting the Bill of Quantities (BOQ), an itemized budget 
for the construction and maintenance of this road. 
Agriculture  
There were complaints in the agricultural production sector related to extension and input provision 
through the government agency, Operation Wealth Creation (OWC).  
• Before the baraza in Masindi District, many promises had apparently been made by OWC 
about distribution of planting material, especially mango and orange tree seedlings, which 
were never fulfilled. Since these issues were raised at the baraza, people have started 
receiving the promised seedlings. One farmer in the focus group recounted having personally 
received 10 kg of bean seed while another farmer had received 10 kg of improved maize 
seed. The respondents attribute these changes to the baraza. Goats had also been brought for 
distribution two weeks prior to the baraza event. However, when they were proven to be of 
poor quality by the LC V chairperson, they were taken back. One farmer in the focus groups 
stated that: “…Before a baraza, all these government supplied inputs would reach sub-county 
headquarters but would never reach citizens. Until now we have not accessed one goat or cow 
supplied by OWC … Even if they [the goats] had been of good quality, they would have been 
given or distributed to selected individuals known to officials in charge of inputs and they 
would never reach intended recipients.”  
• During our interviews, citizens concurred with the district CAO that there is now better 
planning by OWC in distribution and monitoring of inputs as a result of the discussions held 
at the Masindi District baraza. OWC began making announcements on the radio about inputs 
received for distribution and farmers now know when and how many of the resources would 
be distributed.  
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• It was revealed at the Masindi District baraza that a government-provided tractor and an 
insemination machine had been lost. A search thus ensued for these missing items. Our 
interviews with stakeholders revealed that the insemination machine had already been found. 
Efforts to recover the tractor are still underway. 
Others 
• The CAO took up the issue of an employee who retired prior to the start of a project that 
provided a gratuity to pensioners. This resulted in a committee formed by the minister to 
address this case and similar future ones. 
• In Masindi District, wetlands have also been mapped and demarcated with concrete stones 
and citizens have been urged not to encroach on them.  
• Citizens at the Masindi District Baraza also used the baraza to demand higher quality 
services. For instance, market vendors forced district authorities to remove poor quality anti-
burglary windows which had been installed in a new market building. Subsequently, better 
quality windows were procured and installed. Citizens attributed this change to the 
empowerment of market vendors through the baraza.  
These improvements in public service provision aside, it was clear from the interviews with baraza 
participants that not all promises made during the barazas had materialized by the time of our interviews. 
In Masindi, many issues raised at the baraza persisted by the time of the follow-up focus group 
discussions, including issues related to poor roads, electricity, officials not showing up for work, poor to 
non-existent extension services, and limited information on recruitment criteria for public servants, 
especially for army and police. In Bagezza Sub-county, the Minister for General Duties had promised iron 
sheets and a brick-making machine at the baraza, but these have not yet been delivered. Some of these 
delays in fulfilling commitments and improvements in service delivery could be the result of the short 
time span between the time when the barazas were conducted and the time of our follow-up interviews.  
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6. REFLECTION ON POTENTIAL PATHWAYS 
In this section, reflections are made concerning the key impact pathways identified in the interviews, 
highlighting the reduction of information inefficiencies and increased top-down monitoring, among 
others. 
Reducing information inefficiencies was one of the key impact pathways repeatedly mentioned 
by stakeholder groups.  
The Bagezza Sub-county LC III chairperson noted that provision of more information during a 
baraza is important because citizens get to understand what “belongs” to them. He further noted that 
many stakeholders that were present at the baraza confessed that information deficiencies seemed to be a 
real issue. The example of the school was used: Both technical and political staff at the sub-county level 
heard of the plans to open a new school in the sub-county, but it was only after questioning the CAO 
during the baraza that they learned that the funds were there and a school board meeting had already taken 
place. It was pointed out that it is the CAO’s responsibility to ensure that the school is constructed and the 
CAO now knows people’s priorities. 
More generally, the LC III chairperson emphasized the fact that barazas gave him information on 
what communities prioritize. He explained that the flow of information used to be poor, but after the 
baraza, it was much better. He cited that there had been a great deal of improvement in the flow of 
information at all levels (district, sub-county, parish, and village) which had not been the case before the 
baraza. One example of this was the creation of a WhatsApp group as an information sharing platform, 
created by the CAO (with the deputy CAO as the administrator of the group), specifically about service 
delivery issues in the district. Several sub-county leaders and citizens became part of this WhatsApp 
group since its inception and this has empowered citizens to demand services from their leaders.  
The LC III chairperson acknowledged that his work is made much easier if information is 
flowing, both to and from service providers and service recipients. Information that flows from 
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government officials to citizen helps in managing expectations. The fact that community members can 
raise concerns and feel listened to also has a direct impact on their levels of satisfaction with the services. 
Reducing information inefficiencies by means of enhanced information provision was also listed 
as the main impact pathway by the Mubende District RDC. She noted that since the baraza took place, 
significantly more citizens directly speak to her. To illustrate, she showed the researchers an example of a 
text message she had received that day from a parent complaining that teachers are not showing up for 
work. Similarly, the Mubende CAO commented that due to increased communication and information 
sharing, the sector heads seemed to conduct business more seriously after the baraza. 
A second major impact pathway was through increased top-down monitoring: 
According to the Chief of Baggeza Sub-county, barazas are capable of exposing shoddy work. 
Therefore, the baraza makes service providers more conscious of the quality of their work. Health 
assistants now go to communities to inspect households. Councilors now make sure they know what is in 
the sub-county budget. For new projects initiated in the sub-county, the sub-county Chief now receives 
full details about them, and she is instructed to supervise the work of these projects. All this did not 
happen in such a systematic and organized manner before the baraza. 
In Masindi, it was also stated that, as a result of the baraza, monitoring has improved and 
councilors are now very critical, requesting details and BOQ. The winner of tenders now needs to be 
declared publicly. Auditors are frequently called in and further substantiation at the site is being sought to 
verify the contents of reports rather than relying only on written statements as was done in the past.  
One interesting observation from the Masindi Town Clerk (equivalent of the sub-county Chief for 
urban sub-counties) was that councilors “learned to monitor” projects as a result of the baraza. According 
to the Town Clerk, there have been significant changes in the way councilors interpret reports and in the 
type of questions that councilors ask technocrats. According to the Town Clerk, politicians in Uganda are 
often poorly educated. After a baraza, he noticed that politicians started to imitate more vocal and 
educated citizens such as CSO members or local businessmen who often speak out during barazas.  
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Another impact pathway identified was related to increased community involvement in 
monitoring government projects. For example, in Masindi, a local councilor reported that local citizens 
are now better informed as to when a project starts, what it entails, and when it is expected to be finished. 
The local citizens are also provided with the BOQ to make sure that what they expect corresponds to what 
was planned (e.g. only a murram road was planned when citizens may expect a tarmac highway). Villages 
are even encouraged to set up their own monitoring teams to make sure no fuel and other supplies are 
stolen. 
The sub-county Chief has also observed many changes among the citizens themselves with 
respect to clarified roles and responsibilities of different actors. For instance, before the baraza, 
citizens would request the sub-county Chief for boreholes, even though this was an intervention that only 
the district could handle. After the baraza, citizens first ask if what they complain about is under the 
mandate of a sub-county or district. 
Citizens are thought to have become more active in reporting concerns. They have also become 
more vocal and confident when reporting issues. For example, the Mubende District RDC mentioned that 
one of the main benefits of the baraza is that citizens now know that it is their responsibility to report 
problems such as health workers that do not show up, boreholes that have dried, or when wetlands are 
destroyed. She mentioned that when complaints are made, she will intervene by going personally to 
inspect the issue, then discuss the issue with the sub-county Chief, CAO, and/or any other official 
responsible. 
Since the baraza, radios play a more active role in catalyzing accountability. This is because 
officials are less likely to decline an invitation to participate in talk shows where citizens can call in with 
issues and questions; these programs are very popular in Uganda.  
The CAO of Masindi District applauded the baraza as a good institutional governance project, 
explaining that Africans tend to fear governments due to Africa’s history of colonization and subsequent 
autocratic regimes. Any initiative to bring the government and citizens closer together rather than 
perpetuating the “we versus them, the government versus the people” attitude, is a big step in the right 
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direction, the public official said. He further stated that “officials are more able to realize, as they should, 
that office bearers are there because of and for the citizens, and the citizens are more able to realize, as 
they should, that they also have a responsibility in service provision (e.g. civic education)” (personal 
communication). 
The same government official at the local level (CAO) also commented that barazas empower 
people to question government decisions. They have started to write letters to him, asking more 
questions and demanding accountability. Market vendors, for example, have demanded accountability for 
the market dues collected from them.  
Finally, citizens noted that there are other “private” barazas which have since been introduced 
in in Pakanyi Sub-county in Masindi District by Recreation for Development and Peace (RDP) and in 
Kimengo Sub-county by an NGO forum. They relayed that these have also increased awareness about 
different projects and programs implemented in the district.  
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7. MOTIVATING FACTORS 
Service providers, citizens and politicians were each asked to comment on the likely reasons behind 
observed changes in the actions and attitudes of the other stakeholders as a consequence of the baraza. 
Service providers acknowledged that citizens are now more compelled to report service delivery 
issues than before and that their complaints are holding service providers to account. The increased flow 
of information about what is expected and what has actually happened with respect to public service 
delivery leads to a change in service providers’ norms and practices due to a fear that they will be 
reported to their bosses such as the CAO and LC V chairperson  and that this may result in indictment. 
For example, in Masindi District, an engineer and his whole staff were arrested and a sub-county Chief in 
one sub-county was indicted as a result of endorsing payments for shoddy work. The contractor was paid 
a sum of 11 million Ugandan shillings (roughly 3,000 USD) for work that was only valued at 2.5 million 
Uganda shillings. This incident was confirmed by citizens that attended the district-level baraza in 
Masindi.  
Citizens mentioned that service providers fear being arrested. They fear that citizens will report 
shoddy work or irregularities. A Masindi District council member noted that some service providers have 
been summoned to the parliamentary public accounts committee.  
Politicians stated that they are beginning to fear that if they do not do their job to their 
constituents’ utmost satisfaction, they will not be voted into office when their mandate expires in 2021. 
This has reduced corruption. For example, civil servants and politicians who would connive to award 
themselves contracts have stopped. Politicians have pulled out of tender bids once they realize that a time 
will come to account to the citizens. Before the baraza, civil servants would often be held at ransom by 
politicians: civil servants would make a budget but the politicians, who often are signatories, would not 
approve the budget unless their companies are awarded lucrative deals. 
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8. HINDRANCES TO BARAZAS ACHIEVING THE GOAL 
OF ENHANCED SERVICE DELIVERY 
Focus group discussions suggest barazas are a good governance tool to curb corruption tendencies and 
improve accountability and public service delivery. However, a baraza can only be effective if there is 
follow up by all the stakeholders involved. In particular, it is important that a subsequent baraza is 
organized in the same area in a relatively short period such that residents can be updated on the steps 
taken to resolve the issues raised at the previous baraza. In principle, OPM is supposed to conduct barazas 
every six months but this has not happened as designed. Failure to follow up on issues raised during the 
baraza, both in terms of action and information, may be a real threat to barazas as a governance tool. The 
optimism among the stakeholders, the citizens in particular, may quickly turn into disappointment if none 
of the issues raised during the baraza is addressed, leaving communities worse off than before the baraza. 
This is also reflected in a recent study by Buntaine et al (forthcoming). They warn that there can be 
unexpected consequences of information sharing among citizens, such that citizens who were previously 
unaware of or unaffected by a problem in a neighboring village may become aware of an issue being 
discussed in a way that leads to an increased sense of disempowerment or exclusion. This recent study 
showed that information sharing actually led to new resentments rather than helping to drive participatory 
community-led development. 
Another clear hindrance to achieving improved outcomes from the introduction of a baraza in a 
community, is the often poor relationship between politicians and technical personnel. Particularly in 
Masindi, we found that the relationship between the CAO and the LC V chairperson was quite bad. We 
received signals that the situation got even worse after the baraza (culminating in the chairperson 
confiscating the CAO’s vehicle because the latter used the vehicle after business hours). It may not be 
conducive for service provision if a baraza exposes to the wider public issues beyond accountability 
mishaps. 
Another hindrance to achieving optimal baraza impacts relates to the fact that some civil servants 
may be nearing retirement and thus have little incentive to hold staff answerable to them accountable 
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for their shortcomings. For example, a local councilor in the Masindi District mentioned that absenteeism 
is still a problem in the hospital. Staff obtain additional employment at private health centers and dedicate 
limited time to their public health center posts. He conjectures that the Distinct Health Officer is about to 
retire and has no incentive to address the problem. 
Some of the issues that are mentioned during the barazas simply fall under the responsibility of 
higher levels of government or other institutions that are beyond the operational jurisdiction of the 
baraza. 
• One official was very critical of OWC, stating that it does more harm than good. He 
explained that 90 percent of inputs for distribution are centrally produced. OWC advertises 
what they need and producers apply. If the producer wins, they get a three-year contract to 
supply OWC the inputs (e.g. seed, heifers, etc.). However, most of the input providers cannot 
handle the volumes. This results in maize seeds arriving late, off the main planting season; 
heifers never being delivered; and so on. This was all explained during the barazas and 
citizens now understand but obviously this did not solve the problem.  
• The issue of jurisdiction is also sometimes used in bad faith. During the barazas, it was 
mentioned that some teachers have been in the same school for more than 15 years. The 
consensus was that teachers with such experience should be relocated to help build up new 
schools. Although the CAO has the mandate to relocate teachers, this has not yet happened 
partly because the CAO insists on first consulting the central body, the education ministry, 
which often delays decisions.  
• The limits of what a baraza at a certain level of government can achieve was also mentioned 
by the Masindi District CAO. The CAO noted that he has personally forwarded some of the 
policy-level issues to the center for consideration. He also noted that lower local governments 
now know that they are there to serve people. He noted, however, that not all issues should be 
handled by his office since his office may not have the capacity to reach everywhere and do 
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everything on time. He gave the example that health-related issues or complaints should be 
handled by Health Unit Management Committees (HUMCs) rather than forwarding them to 
the CAO, as “At that level, HUMCs have the mandate and powers to resolve some of the 
issues/complaints” (personal communication).  
Problems related to incompatible command hierarchies and incentive structures have been documented 
also in the government-led yellow-star initiative. This initiative was introduced in 2001 in Uganda as a 
means to increase quality monitoring within local and district health centers. The study found out that 
after attaining the yellow star, it was still possible for patients or other community members to report 
breaches in the standard of services (Berlan and Shiffman 2012). A recent reassessment shows that the 
yellow star program can make a difference in the behavior of and service provided in the hospitals of 
Uganda, but multi-faceted underlying issues that deter health care workers from improving their service 
must be addressed. For example, local authorities had little to no say on hospital staff behavior if they had 
no responsibility over remuneration. In other words, the reward being offered by the yellow star was not 
felt at the level of those responsible for the service provision (Baufoff and Oroxom forthcoming).  
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9. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE BARAZAS 
Drawing on the reflections of participants on the impact pathways, motivations, and hindrances to optimal 
public service delivery outcomes, we also asked our participants to help us pull together 
recommendations for future barazas to be held. 
One commonality that came through in the responses reflected insufficient and tardy publicity 
concerning the event. A lesson learned was for barazas to be announced early enough for information to 
be passed from posters, for example, to as many people as possible, especially given that word-of-mouth 
advertising is a primary vehicle for publicizing information, in part due to the high rates of illiteracy in 
the area. Furthermore, when barazas are publicized earlier, it allows citizens, especially those traveling 
from far-away parishes, the opportunity to look for transport to the baraza venue.  
Many participants requested greater engagement in simultaneous citizen education. For example, 
while the Mubende District CAO was supportive of the idea behind the baraza, he stressed that the 
approach should be changed to fully encompass an integrated civic education component. He voiced his 
frustration that citizens often expect too much from service providers and complain about things that are a 
citizen’s own responsibility. As a service provider, there is only so much one can (and should) do. 
Examples include the following:  
• Service providers construct boreholes but citizens should still boil water before drinking 
(instead of complaining that the water from the bore hole makes them sick).  
• Service providers can provide farmers with seeds but it is up to the farmer to apply 
recommended practices to achieve a good harvest.  
• Service providers construct wells but it is up to parents to make sure their children do not 
play on the structure.  
• Service providers can build a road but this may not lead to a relevant outcome, as people may 
not be using it for the intended purpose but to dry their cassava, for example.  
For inputs to translate into improved living conditions, citizens also need to be made aware of their own 
roles and responsibilities. Barazas could thus be improved by focusing more on how citizens contribute 
to translating outputs into outcomes. This was also echoed by a technical staffer who lamented the 
focus on measurable output indicators: “It is not enough to simply count the number of boreholes put in 
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place because the boreholes must be used to contribute to its intended outcome: to provide water to 
citizens in a way that improves health and sanitation among communities” (personal communication). 
The Masindi District Town Clerk commented that information gaps sometimes exist because 
councilors at all levels do not always report back to their constituencies. Along with civic education, the 
clerk specifically recommended improved management of expectations for citizens. For instance, when 
there is discussion about the construction of a road, citizens may think of a highway, while what is 
planned is a murram feeder road. Figures quoted should be put in context for the benefit of the public. 
It was also recommended that other actors need to take up a more active role in civic 
education: it has been shown that FM radio stations have been instrumental in effecting change, so the 
government should facilitate the distribution of information by means of these radio stations to educate 
citizens about things like the correct processes to pursue change or accountability in their communities. 
Religious institutions have a role in educating citizens regarding issues affecting their lives that they have 
not been addressed. The Kingdom and other cultural institutions, for instance, should also be actively 
involved in development activities.  
Citizens that received district-level barazas mentioned that barazas should not stop here but 
should also drill down to lower (sub-county) levels. The Masindi District CAO contends that barazas 
should be organized at the sub-county level as well as the district level, to get a more complete view 
of the diversity of government programs and projects. Moreover, it becomes complicated for citizens to 
trek long distances from their communities to attend barazas at the district headquarters. 
The fact that users started to use social media such as WhatsApp to monitor public services 
suggests that technological innovations may play a more prominent role in continuous monitoring in the 
future. While the mobile technology and ICT revolution has not gone unnoticed in areas such as micro-
finance (Suri and Jack 2016) and agricultural extension information provision (Van Campenhout et al. 
2017), research on the use of these technologies to improve governance is relatively new. One ongoing 
study at a more aggregate level produced only mixed results up to now (Grossman et al. 2016). 
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Other suggestions for improvement included that barazas should not be organized just once, but 
at least twice a year, and that barazas should avoid technical jargon to make sure citizens understand 
what is communicated.  
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on focus group discussions, this paper explores the potential causal pathways that underlie changes 
in outcomes that may emanate from baraza interventions in Uganda and the behavioral changes of actors. 
From discussions held with different stakeholders, we examine hindrances to achieving positive outcomes 
of the baraza and enumerate opportunities for the improvement of future barazas. This analysis will 
benefit the proper alignment of causal pathways in the forthcoming quantitative impact evaluation. 
Lessons learned from these assessments will improve the OPM in planning and implementation of future 
barazas with the ultimate goal of enhancing public service delivery. 
We focus on two barazas, one held at the district level and the other at the lower sub-county level. 
For each baraza, we perform a series of focus group discussions with the 3 main stakeholders (politicians, 
civil servants and citizens), as well as some additional semi-structured interviews with experts. We 
inquire about changes that happened since the baraza was held and are likely to have happened because 
the issue was raised during the baraza. We also ask respondents to reflect on how this change came about 
and what motivated the agents involved to affect the changes. We also point out some of the factors that 
may reduce the effectiveness of the barazas and provide some recommendations for improvements. 
In general, stakeholders were very positive about barazas. We were able to collect a long list of 
improvements that were thought to emanate from the baraza. Barazas seem to be especially important to 
reduce information asymmetries, as government officials learn about the priorities of the citizens, and 
citizens’ often unrealistic expectations are matched up against reality. In addition, the bottom-up approach 
of the baraza leads to an increase in top-down monitoring, as officials learn from vocal citizens how to 
scrutinize public services delivered.  
Failure to follow up on the issues raised during baraza is a real threat to the baraza model. As a 
baraza raises awareness about issues and increases expectations, it may backfire if no action ensues. 
People may become disillusioned and completely lose faith in government and service providers. It is thus 
important that barazas are held at regular intervals.  
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Instead of just holding government accountable, barazas can also become a platform to 
collectively reflect on how inputs can be most effectively translated into outcomes, and what the role of 
each stakeholder is. Therefore, barazas should not only focus on the responsibilities of politicians and 
public servants and provide statistics on goods delivered and services rendered. Attention for civic 
education, where citizens are sensitized about proper use of services and their responsibility in 
maintaining public infrastructure, are also important to lead to improved outcomes in terms of general 
well-being.  
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